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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(a) and Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(8). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Where a worker has suffered a compensable work-related injury, what 
standard is applied to determine the worker's right to additional compensation for a 
subsequent exacerbation of the primary injury? 
Section 34A-2-401(1) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act" hereafter) 
provides medical and disability benefits to workers "injured by accident arising out of and 
in the course o f employment. Here, Mr. Lieberman injured his cervical spine while 
employed by McKesson. He then exacerbated the cervical spine injury in a subsequent non-
work accident. This Court is asked to identify the correct legal standard to be used to 
determine if Mr. Lieberman is entitled to workers' compensation benefits for the non-work 
exacerbation of his work-related injury. 
Preservation of Issue For Appeal: McKesson raised this issue in its motion for review 
to the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission, thereby preserving the issue for 
judicial appellate review. (See McKesson's motion for review to the Appeals Board, 
included as Addendum B in McKesson's initial brief.) 
Standard of Review: Appellate courts are vested with the authority to determine the 
law. Consequently, this Court will not defer to the Appeals Board's selection of the legal 
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standard to apply to Mr. Liebennan's claim, but will instead apply a "correctness'* standard 
and determine the proper legal standard for itself. Drake v. Industrial Commission, 939 P.2d 
177, 181 (Utah 1997); Esquivel v. Labor Commission: 7 P.3d 777, 780 (Utah 2000). 
2. Has the Appeals Board reasonably applied the correct legal standard to Mr. 
Lieberman's claim? 
Assuming the Appeals Board selected the correct legal standard for evaluating Mr. 
Lieberman's claim, has the Appeals Board reasonably applied that standards to the facts of 
the claim? 
Preservation of Issue For Appeal: By necessary implication, this issue was raised in 
McKesson's motion for review to the Appeals Board, thereby preserving the issue for 
appellate judicial review. (See McKesson's motion for review to the Appeals Board, set 
forth as Addendum B in McKesson's initial brief.) 
Standard of Review: In Drake v. Industrial Commission, 939 P.2d at 182, a workers' 
compensation case requiring the application of the "special errand rule," the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
. . . a trial court's or agency's application of the law to the facts may, 
depending on the issue, be reviewed by an appellate court 'with varying 
degrees of strictness, falling anywhere between a review for 'correctness' and 
a broad 'abuse of discretion' standard. 
(Citations omitted.) The Court then concluded that in cases where: 1) the issue in dispute 
is fact-intensive and 2) there are only a limited number of appellate decisions to provide 
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guidance, it is appropriate to extend "heightened deference" to the Commission's 
application of law to fact. Id. 
As in Drake, the issues presented by Mr. Lieberman's claim are fact-intensive. Also 
as in Drake, Utah's appellate courts have had few occasions to address the particular facts 
of other claims similar to Mr. Lieberman's claim. Consequently, the same considerations 
that prompted the Utah Supreme Court to give "heightened deference" to the Commission's 
application of law to fact in Drake support a similar deference to the Commission's 
application of law to the facts of Mr. Lieberman's claim. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Section §34A-2-401(l) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act1 establishes the 
general standards by which an injured worker can qualify for benefits under the Act: 
Each employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who is injured and the 
dependents of each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of 
and in the course of the employee's employment, wherever such injury 
occurred, if the accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid 
compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury or death, and such 
amount for medical, nurse and hospital services and medicines, and, in the 
case of death, such amount of funeral expenses, as provided in this chapter. 
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act was recodified effective July 1,1997,21 months after 
Mr. Lieberman's work accident. However, the 1997 recodification made no substantive 
changes to the material provisions of the Act. The Commission's brief will refers to the 
current version of the Act. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: McKesson seeks review of the Commission's award of benefits 
to Mr. Lieberman. Specifically, McKesson challenges 1) the legal standard selected by the 
Commission to determine whether Mr. Lieberman is entitled to benefits and 2) the 
Commission's application of that standard to the facts of Mr. Lieberman's claim. 
Course of Proceedings: On September 25,1995, Mr. Lieberman accidentally injured 
his cervical spine while working for McKesson. McKesson accepted liability under the 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act and paid benefits accordingly. (Addendum A, p. 3) 
On May 22,1999, Mr. Lieberman exacerbated his work-related injury in a non-work 
accident. (Addendum A, p. 4) McKesson denied Mr. Lieberman's claim for additional 
benefits. (R. 7, 8) Mr. Lieberman then filed an Application For Hearing with the 
Commission. (R. 1) 
On May 24,2000, the ALJ awarded benefits to Mr. Lieberman (Addendum A; R. 21-
32) McKesson filed a motion for Commission review of the ALJ's decision. (R. 33-42) 
On August 30, 2000, the Commission denied McKesson's motion for review and affirmed 
the ALJ's decision. (Addendum B; R. 51-55) McKesson then filed a timely petition for 
appellate judicial review of the Commission's decision with this Court. 
Statement of Facts: In denying McKesson's motion for review, the Commission 
adopted the ALJ's findings of facts in toto. McKesson has not raised the Commission's 
findings of fact as an issue for appellate review. Specifically, McKesson has not identified 
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any factual error nor attempted to marshal the evidence against any of the Commission's 
findings. Consequently, the Commission's findings of fact are conclusive for purposes of 
this proceeding. Osman Home Improvement v. Industrial Commission, 958 P.2d 240,241, 
footnote 1 (Utah App. 1998). 
Nevertheless, the "statement of facts" set forth in McKesson's brief is not an entirely 
accurate representation of the facts as determined by the Commission. The Commission 
therefore respectfully refers this Court to Addendum A, attached, which contains the 
complete text of the ALJ's findings, as adopted by the Commission. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Section 34A-2-401(l) of the Act requires payment of medical and disability benefits 
to workers "injured by accident arising out of and in the course o f their employment. In 
this case, Mr. Lieberman suffered a compensable work-related injury while employed by 
McKesson. He then exacerbated that work-related injury in a subsequent non-work 
accident. The ultimate question before this Court is whether Mr. Lieberman, who has 
received benefits for his primary work-related injury, is also entitled to additional benefits 
for the subsequent non-work exacerbation of that injury. 
McKesson argues, incorrectly, that Mr. Lieberman's claim for benefits for the 
exacerbation of his work-related injuries should be judged under the test for legal causation 
set forth in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). The Allen test for 
legal causation determines the compensability of a primary work accident; the Allen test 
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is not properly applied in a case such as this, where the issue is the compensability of a non-
work exacerbation of the compensable primary injury. 
While the Allen test does not apply to Mr. Lieberman's current claim, prior decisions 
of Utah's appellate courts have set out the test that does apply. The courts have held 
secondary injuries to be compensable if they are the "direct and natural result" of a 
compensable primary injury. Intermountain Health Care v. Industrial Commission, 839 P.2d 
841 (UtahApp. 1992) 
In applying the "direct and natural result" test to Mr. Lieberman's claim, the Appeals 
Board relied on uncontroverted medical evidence that Mr. Lieberman's initial work accident 
left him with a failed cervical fusion. This failed cervical fusion was then exacerbated by 
a non-work accident. The uncontroverted medical evidence also established a medically 
demonstrable causal relationship between Mr. Lieberman's primary work-related accident 
and his current symptoms. The Appeals Board also carefully considered the circumstances 
and conditions of Mr. Lieberman's non-work accident and found that Mr. Lieberman's 
actions were not negligent so as to cut the chain of causation between his primary work 
injuries and the subsequent exacerbation of those injuries. 
In summary, the Appeals Board applied the correct legal standard to the 
uncontroverted facts of Mr Lieberman's claim. Consistent with the long-established 
principle that the Utah Workers' Compensation Act is to be liberally construed in favor of 
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compensation, the Appeals Board reasonably concluded that Mr. Lieberman's current 
injuries are compensable as the direct and natural result of his earlier work-related injury. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE: THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT IS 
LIBERALLY CONSTRUED IN FAVOR OF COMPENSATION. 
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act is liberally construed in favor of coverage and 
compensation. In Chandler v. Industrial Commission, 184 P. 1020, 1021 (Utah 1919), 
decided only a few years after enactment of the Utah Employers' Liability Act (predecessor 
to the Utah Workers' Compensation Act), the Utah Supreme Court applied this principle of 
liberal construction, stating: "Upon the question that the Employers' Liability Act should 
be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes, all courts agree." (Citation omitted.) 
After Chandler, Utah's appellate courts continued to apply the principle. For 
example, in Park Utah Consol. Mines v. Industrial Commission, 84 Utah 841,36 P.2d 979, 
981 (Utah 1934), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
If there is any doubt "respecting the right to compensation, such doubt should 
be resolved in favor of the employee or of his dependents as the case may be." 
(Citing Chandler v. Industrial Commission, supra.) 
Likewise, in Maryland Cas. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 12 Utah 2d 223,364 P.2d 1020, 
1022 (Utah 1961), the Utah Supreme Court explained the policy reasons behind the principle 
of liberal construction: 
These purposes inhere in (the Act): that injuries suffered in employment 
should be spread throughout and be borne by industry; and that compensation 
should be provided to alleviate economic hardship falling on injured workers 
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and their dependents, which in turn has a beneficial effect in stabilizing the 
economy. . . 
To accomplish its salutary purposes, the Act should be liberally construed in 
favor of coverage of the claimant. 
More recently, in Heaton v. Second Injury Fund. 796 P.2d 676,679 (Utah 1990), the 
Court stated: 
It is the duty of the courts and the commission to construe the Workers' 
Compensation Act liberally and in favor of employee coverage when statutory 
terms reasonably admit of such a construction. 
Recently, both the Utah Supreme Court and this Court have reaffirmed the continued 
vitality of the principle of liberal construction: See Olsen v. Samuel Mclntvre Inv. Co. 956 
P.2d 257 at 260 (Utah 1998); see also Burgess v. Siaperas Sand & Gravel. 965 P.2d 583, 
588 (Utah App. 1998). 
So, for the last 80 years, Utah's appellate courts have enforced "the common law 
principle of liberal construction in favor of injured employees that is at the heart of the Act." 
Burgess. 965 P.2d at 588. 
The Commission recognizes that this principle of liberal construction does not mean 
that compensation should be allowed in every claim. Walls v. Industrial Commission. 857 
P.2d 964, (Utah App. 1993). However, in cases such as Mr. Lieberman's, where a natural 
and direct connection exists between his employment at McKesson and the injuries for 
which he seeks compensation, the principle of liberal construction supports the 
Commission's conclusion that Mr. Lieberman is entitled to compensation. 
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POINT TWO: UNDER PRIOR DECISIONS OF UTAH'S APPELLATE 
COURTS, MR. LIEBERMAN'S NON-WORK INJURY IS 
COMPENSABLE IF IT IS THE DIRECT AND NATURAL RESULT 
OF A COMPENSABLE PRIMARY INJURY. 
There is no dispute that Mr. Lieberman is entitled to workers' compensation benefits 
for injury to his cervical spine arising from his work-related accident at McKesson on 
September 25, 1995. What is in dispute is Mr. Lieberman's right to additional benefits for 
the exacerbation of his cervical spine injury that resulted when he hit his head on the door 
frame of his pickup truck. This Court is asked to determine the proper standard to be 
applied in adjudicating Mr. Lieberman's current claim for additional benefits. 
This is not an entirely new issue. 1 Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, § 10.01 
("Direct and Natural Consequence Rule") has compiled decisions on the issue and arrived 
at following conclusion: 
A distinction must be observed between causation rules affecting the 
primary injury . . . and causation rules that determine how far the range of 
compensable consequences is carried, once the primary injury is causally 
connected with the employment. . . . But when the question is whether 
compensability should be extended to a subsequent injury or aggravation 
related in some way to the primary injury, the rules that come into play are 
essentially based upon the concepts of "direct and natural results," and of 
the claimant's own conduct as an independent intervening cause. 
(Emphasis added.) 
This Court's decision in Intermountain Health Care, 839 P.2 841, also identifies the 
"direct and natural result" standard as applicable to claims such as Mr. Lieberman's. In that 
case, Taylor, the applicant, injured her back while working for Intermountain Health Care 
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('"IHC"). IHC accepted liability and paid workers' compensation benefits. Two years after 
her primary accident, Taylor experienced severe pain when, while at home, she attempted 
to lift her grandchild. IHC refused to pay additional workers' compensation benefits on the 
grounds that the injuries Taylor experienced after her non-work accident were not 
sufficiently related to her earlier work accident. 
This Court rejected IHC's argument and affirmed the Commission's award of 
benefits, stating: 
We do not agree with IHC that the correct standard for determining 
employer liability for subsequent injuries occurring after an industrial injury 
essentially amounts to a "but for" analysis. In Mountain States Casing Sers. 
v. McKean, 706 P.2d 601 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court stated that 
u[a] subsequent injury is compensable if it is found to be a natural result of 
a compensable primary injury." Id. at 602 (emphasis added). A claimant "is 
not required to show that his original tragedy was the sole cause of a 
subsequent injury, but only that the initial work-related accident was a 
contributing cause'''of'the subsequent injury. Id. (Emphasis added). McKean 
and P ere he Hi both draw from Larson's statement of the general rule regarding 
workers' compensation, which provides in pertinent part: 
The basic rule is that a subsequent injury, whether an 
aggravation of the original injury or a new and distinct injury, 
is compensable if it is the direct and natural result of a 
compensable primary injury. (Citing 1 Larson, Workmen's 
Compensation Law, §13.11 (1992). 
Intermountain Health Care, 839 at 845. 
Thus, this Court's decision in Intermountain Health Care answers the fundamental 
question raised in McKesson's petition for review. Mr. Lieberman's subsequent injury is 
compensable if it is the direct and natural result of his compensable primary injury. 
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POINT THREE: THE ALLEN TEST FOR LEGAL CAUSATION 
DOES NOT APPLY TO MR. LIEBERMAN'S CURRENT CLAIM. 
McKesson argues that Mr. Lieberman's claim must be evaluated under the standards 
for legal causation set forth in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d at 25. However, 
McKesson's argument is unsupported by the Allen decision itself and is inconsistent with 
post-Allen precedent. 
The Allen decision: The Allen decision is a seminal case in Utah's workers' 
compensation jurisprudence. But in defining the term "accident" and establishing the 
requirements of medical and legal causation, the Allen court defined the standards to be 
applied to a worker's primary injuries. The issue now before this Court-the 
compensability of a worker's exacerbation of a work-related injury, was not considered in 
Allen. 
The difference between the issues presented in Allen and the issue presented in Mr. 
Lieberman's claim is important. In the words of Professor Larson: "A distinction must be 
observed between causation rules affecting the primary injury . . . and causation rules that 
determine how far the range of compensable consequences is carried, once the primary 
injury is causally connected with the employment." 1 Larson's Workers' Compensation 
Law, §10.01. The Allen decision sets forth standards applicable to the former question; this 
Court's decision in Intermountain Health Care, 839 P.2d 841, addresses the latter question. 
Post- Allen precedent: McKesson argues that the Allen decision, issued in 1986, 
changed Utah law for determining whether a subsequent injury is compensable following 
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a compensable primary injury. Specifically, at page 14 of its initial brief, McKesson 
contends "(t)he Commission improperly selected and applied the law pre-dating the Allen 
decision." However, McKesson itself has failed to address, or even cite, this Court's 
decision in Intermountain Health Care: issued six years after the Allen decision and directly 
relevant to the facts of Mr. Lieberman's claim. 
In fact, McKesson has not identified any post-Allen decisions which have applied the 
Allen test of legal causation to cases such as Mr. Lieberman's. The Commission submits 
that appellate precedent represented by this Court's decision in Intermountain Health Care 
provides the proper standard for adjudication of Mr. Lieberman's claim. 
POINT FOUR: THE COMMISSION REASONABLY CONCLUDED 
THAT THE EXACERBATION OF MR. LIEBERMAN'S CERVICAL 
SPINE INJURY WAS THE NATURAL AND DIRECT RESULT OF 
HIS PRIMARY WORK-RELATED INJURY. 
As noted above, this Court has previously held that a subsequent injury is 
compensable if it is the "direct and natural result" of a compensable primary injury. In 
Intermountain Health Care, 839 P.2d at 846, this Court explained the manner in which the 
"direct and natural result" should be applied. "The applicable test includes an analysis of 
the facts surrounding the subsequent injury and analysis of the connection between the 
subsequent injury and original compensable injury." 
With respect to Mr. Lieberman's claim, the ALJ's findings of fact, adopted by the 
Commission, sets out the circumstances surrounding Mr. Lieberman's injuries.2 On 
2 
The ALJ's decision is attached as Addendum A. The following statements of fact are found 
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September 25, 1995, while Mr. Lieberman was working for McKesson, a case of lotion 
weighing 14 pounds fell on his head. Dr. Hood diagnosed Mr. Lieberman's injuries from 
the accident as a herniated intervertebral disc at the C6-7 level and spondylosis at the C5-6 
level. 
On March 19,1996, Dr. Hood performed surgery on Mr. Lieberman's cervical spine, 
including microsurgical anterior diskectomy, decompression, allograft, fusion and plate 
fixation. However, Mr. Lieberman continued to suffer neck pain and stiffness. Ultimately, 
it was determined that Mr. Lieberman had suffered a non-union of the attempted cervical 
fusion. He continued to experience progressive neck pain with periods of temporary total 
disability from his industrial accident. 
Then, on May 22,1999, as Mr. Lieberman was entering his pickup truck at his home, 
he forcefully hit the top of his head on the door frame. The blow stunned him and he fell 
to his knees. When Mr. Lieberman hit his head on his pickup door, he exacerbated his pre-
existing cervical spine injury. In the words of Dr. Chung: "This nonunion pre-existed the 
5-20-99 home incident. In my opinion it is reasonable to assume the 5-20-99 home incident 
exacerbated his pre-existing cervical spine condition." (See R.65, Medical Records Exhibit, 
Tab #8, pagel2U) Dr. Hood agreed. "There was a non-union of the fusion. About 5-20-
99 patient bumped his head which caused exacerbation of the symptoms related to the non-
union." (S. R. 65, Medical Records Exhibit, Tab #10, page 24 E) Dr. Hood further 
concluded that a medically demonstrative causal relationship exists between Mr. 
at pages three through 6 of the ALJ's decision. 
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Lieberman's current medical problems and his work-related injuries of September 25, 1995, 
and has recommended additional surgery to remove the old hardware associated with the 
failed fusion and to make another effort to accomplish the fusion. (R. 65, Medical Record 
Exhibit, Tab #10, page 24 E) 
In summary, it was Mr. Lieberman's primary work-related accident at McKesson that 
required the first attempt to surgically fuse his cervical spine. That first fusion attempt 
failed. The incident of May 22, 1999, when Mr. Lieberman hit his head on his pickup door, 
merely exacerbated the symptoms of an already-failed fusion. 
McKesson argues that Mr. Lieberman was negligent for hitting his head on his pickup 
door, thereby breaking the chain of causation between his work-related accident and his 
current injuries. The Appeals Board addressed that argument in its decision denying 
McKesson's motion for review: 
In Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, §10.15, p. 10-12, Professor 
Larson reviews decisions from several states, including Utah, and concludes 
the following test should be applied to claims such as Mr. Lieberman's: 
When . . . the injury following the initial compensable 
injury does not arise out of a quasi-course activity,... the chain 
of causation may be deemed broken by either intentional or 
negligent claimant misconduct. 
As to what constitutes "negligence" for purposes of the foregoing standard, 
Professor Larson indicates it "often takes the form of rashly undertaking a line 
of action with knowledge of the risk created by the weakened member.'" 
Larson at §10-06(3), p. 10-18. 
Next, it is necessary to determine whether Mr. Lieberman's action in 
getting into his pickup was "negligent" so as to break the chain of causation 
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between his work acc.dent of September 25, 1995, and his current inmnes 
There is no indication that Mr Lieberman's acted in a rash or foolhardy 
manner in entering his p.ckup, rather, the event appears to be a simple 
accident brought on by ordinary error or unintentional miscalculation The 
Appeals Board concludes Mr Lieberman was not negligent and that his non-
work acc.dent in 1999 does not break the chain of causation between his 1995 
work accident and his current injuries. 
As noted by the Appeals Board, when Mr Lieberman hit his head on May 22, 1999, 
he uas not behaving in a foolhardy manner, nor was he undertaking a rash act Rather, he 
was attempting to perform the ordinary task of entering and sitting m the driver's seat of a 
pickup truck, a task perhaps made more difficult by the work-related cervical injuries Mr 
Lieberman had suffered. It is not uncommon for any individual, even those without cervical 
injuries, to bump their heads on shelves, cabinet doors, or automobile door frames. Such 
accidents do not necessarily establish negligence. 
The underlying circumstances of this case support the Appeals Board specific finding 
that Mr Lieberman's conduct in entering his pickup truck on May 22, 1999, was not 
negligent and did not break the chain of causation between his work-related accident and 
his current medical problems 
CONCLUSION 
The Labor Commission respectfully requests this Court to affirm the Appeals Board's 
award of additional workers' compensation benefits to Mr. Lieberman, on the grounds that 
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Mr. Lieberman's current injuries are the direct and natural result of his work-related 
accident at McKesson. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND ORDER 
Judge: Richard M. La Jeunesse 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARING: Room 336, Labor Commission, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
on February 29, 2000, at 10:00 a.m. Said Hearing was pursuant to Order 
and Notice of the Commission. 
BEFORE: Richard M. La Jeunesse, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The petitioner was present and represented himself pro se. 
The respondents were represented by attorney Henry K. Chai II 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The petitioner, Robert Lieberman, filed an "Application For Hearing" on September 17, 1999, 
and claimed entitlement to: payment of medical expenses; payment for recommended medical 
care, and; temporary total compensation. Mr. Lieberman's claim for workers' compensation 
benefits arose from an injury to his neck which he sustained on September 25, 1995. 
The respondent, McKesson Corporation admitted that Mr. Lieberman injured his cervical neck 
which injury arose out of and within the course of his employment at McKesson. However, 
McKesson argued that the disabilities for which Mr. Lieberman currently claims compensation 
resulted from an intervening nonindustrial injury that occurred on or about May 22, 1999. 




Were Mr. Lieberman's injuries for which he currently seeks workers' compensation benefits 
caused by the industrial accident of September 25, 1995, or an intervening nonindustrial accident 
on or about May 22, 1999? 
III. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
On September 28, 1996, Mr. Lieberman and McKesson entered into a "Compensation 
Agreement" whereby McKesson agreed to pay Mr. Lieberman 48.6596 weeks of temporary total 
disability compensation for various periods between September 6, 1995, and September 18, 
1996, in the total amount of $13,965.35. The parties stipulated that S287.00 per week constituted 
the compensation rate for Mr. Lieberman's temporary total disability. 
McKesson also agreed to pay Mr. Lieberman $10,707.84 in total permanent partial disability 
compensation at the rate of $286.00 per week for 37.44 weeks derived from a 12% impairment to 
the whole person. Finally McKesson agreed to pay $10,392.04 in medical bills incurred by Mr. 
Lieberman. On October 15, 1996, Judge Benjamin Sims issued a "Lump Sum Order" that 
accelerated the payment of the permanent total disability compensation. No dispute existed that 
McKesson paid all of the sums agreed to in the "Compensation Agreement/' 
On July 3, 1997, Mr. Lieberman filed an "Application For Hearing'1 with respect to his 
September 25, 1995 injury. Mr. Lieberman requested the payment of additional medical 
expenses and temporary total compensation. Mr. Lieberman claimed further temporary total 
disability from January 8, 1997, through April 28, 1997. 
McKesson denied additional liability for Mr. Lieberman's temporary total disability between 
January 8, 1997, and April 28, 1997. McKesson asserted that Mr. Lieberman suffered no change 
in condition after the "Compensation Agreement" between the parties and therefore, the Labor 
Commission lacked jurisdiction to award additional, temporary total disability compensation. 
On April 10, 1998, Judge Barbara Elicerio issued "Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law, And 
Order" with respect to Mr. Lieberman's July 3, 1997 claim. Judge Elicerio found that Mr. 
Lieberman suffered neck pain and numb arms caused by the September 25, 1995 industrial 
accident that resulted in Mr. Lieberman's temporary total disability from January 8, 1997, 
through April 28, 1997. Consequently Judge Elicerio ordered McKesson to pay Mr. Lieberman 
15.857 additional weeks of temporary total disability compensation for the period between 
January 8, 1997, through April 28, 1997, in the total amount of $4,550.96. Judge Elicerio 
determined that $287.00 per week constituted the compensation rate for temporary total 
disability. Neither party appealed Judge Elicerio's Order. 
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On September 17, 1999, Robert Lieberman, filed an "Application For Hearing" and claimed 
further entitlement to: payment of medical expenses; payment for recommended medical care, 
and; temporary total compensation. 
IV. FINDINGS OF FACT 
A. Employment, Compensation Rate, And Injury. 
The parties stipulated that on September 25, 1995, Mr. Lieberman suffered two herniated disks at 
C5-6 and C6-7, when a 14 pound case of lotion fell from between six and seven feet onto the top 
of Mr. Lieberman's head. McKesson acknowledged that Mr. Lieberman's accident of September 
25, 1995, arose out of and within the course of his employment with McKesson. The parties 
agreed, and Judge Elicerio determined, that Mr. Lieberman's rate of temporary total 
compensation equaled $287.00 per week. 
Dr. Robert Hood M.D. diagnosed Mr. Lieberman's injuries suffered from the accident of 
September 25, 1995, as: "herniated intervertebral disk at C6-7 ... Spondylosis C5-6 right." 
[Exhibit "J-l" p. 5]. On March 19, 1996, Dr. Hood performed the following operation to address 
the problems incurred by Mr. Lieberman as a result of his industrial accident: 
Microsurgical anterior diskectomy, decompression, allograft, fusion and plate 
fixation and C5-6, C6-7. [Exhibit "J-l" p. 5]. 
On July 3, 1996, Dr. Hood reported that: 
Rob is now three and one-half months post-op ACD, allograft interbody fusion 
and plate fixation C5-6-7. He is working, but the company has basically put him 
back to regular duty with repetitive overhead reaching and lifting, contrary to my 
restrictions which said no overhead repetitious lifting. In the last several days this 
has aggravated his neck pain ....[Exhibit "J-l" p. 20]. 
On April 21, 1997, Dr. Hood observed that Mr. Lieberman still suffered: "neck pain and stiffness 
when he has to look upward or when using his arms and hands above his head." [Exhibit "J-lff p. 
23]. On February 10, 1999, Dr. Hood suspected that Mr. Lieberman had a non-union of his 
fusion but that his ongoing neck and shoulder pain resulted from soft tissue fatigue caused by his 
new job. [Exhibit "J-l" p. 24 A]. Judge Elicerio in her Order of April 10, 1998, concluded as a 
matter of law that Mr. Lieberman suffered over three months of post-surgical, temporary total 
disability as a result of his industrial accident. 
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The uncontested evidence in this case confirmed that Mr. Lieberman suffered a nonunion of his 
surgical fusion and continued to experience progressive neck pain with periods of temporary 
total disability from his industrial accident. 
B. Subsequent Injury. 
Mr. Lieberman admitted that on two occasions, May 19, 1999, and May 22, 1999, he struck his 
head on the door frame of his pickup truck. Mr. Lieberman stated that the first instance on May 
19, 1999, amounted to little more than a bump with no serious pain. Mr. Lieberman testified that 
on May 22, 1999, he hurriedly pulled himself into his pickup truck and hit his head hard on the 
door frame. Mr. Lieberman stated he saw a flash and fell to his knees. Mr. Lieberman could not 
recall whether he lost consciousness. 
Mr. Lieberman submitted into evidence Exhibits "P-l" and "P-2," photographs of Mr. 
Lieberman entering the driver's side door of his pickup truck. Exhibits "P-l" and "P-2," 
illustrated that fact that given Mr. Lieberman's natural height, and the height of the truck door ' 
frame, Mr. Lieberman could easily strike his head on the door frame while routinely entering the 
truck. The hearing produced no evidence that the accident of May 22, 1999, resulted from Mr. 
Lieberman's intentional acts, recklessness, or even negligence. 
Mr. Lieberman recounted that after he hit his head on May 22, 1999, he went into his house and 
laid down because of the pain. Mr. Lieberman averred that the pain he suffered on May 22, 
1999, resembled the pain he suffered from the accident of September 25, 1995. 
On June 7, 1999, Dr. Hood observed that: 
He has suspected nonunion at C6-7 but was minimally symptomatic until about 
May 20 when he was getting into his truck, rose up and hit the edge of the door 
with the vertex of his scalp. The first time he hit it mildly and a few days later he 
hit it quite forcefully, stunning him with immediate worsening of his neck and 
upper back pain radiating to the upper trapezii ...He has been unable to work since 
May 24 at my request. [Exhibit "J-1" p. 24B]. 
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On June 28, 1999, Dr Michael Chung M D stated that 
Based upon the subjective reported history and medical records, Mr Robert 
Lieberman had a significant pre-existing cer\ical spine disease After an 
industrial injury on 9-26-95 where a box landed on his head, he suffered 2 
herniated disks at the C5-6 and C6-7 levels Unfortunately, after a conservative 
treatment course, his symptoms remained unchanged On 3-19-96 Dr Robert 
Hood performed an anterior cervical diskectomy and fusion surgery For 2 to 3 
years after the surgery the patient appeared to have done quite well, although 
occasionally he would have some symptoms WithDr Hood, on 2-10-99, he was 
noted to have a nonunion at the C6-7 level This nonunion pre-existed the 5-20-
99 home incident In my opinion, it is reasonable to assume the 5-20-99 home 
incident exacerbated his pre-existing cervical spine condition [Exhibit "J-1" p 
12S] 
On August 2, 1999, Dr Hood stated 
Rob has failed to improve despite physical therapy Because of his failure of 
relief and documented non-union C6-7,1 have suggested re-exploration, removal 
of hardware, repeat interbody fusion and plate fixation at C6-7 [Exhibit "J-1" p 
24D] 
On September 10, 1999, Dr Hood completed a "Summary Of Medical Record" which 
determined that 
There was a non-union of the fusion About 5-20-99 patient bumped his head 
which caused exacerbation of the symptoms related to the non-union [Exhibit "J-
l"p 24E] 
Dr Hood opined that a medically demonstrative causal relationship existed between Mr 
Lieberman's present symptoms and the mdustnal injury of September 25, 1995 [Exhibit "J-1" 
p 24E] Dr Hood concluded that because of the exacerbation of symptoms related to the non-
union, Mr Lieberman remained temporarily totally disabled from employment ongoing from 
May 24, 1999 [Exhibit "J-1" p 24E] Dr Hood recommended additional surgery to correct the 
problems endured by Mr Lieberman [Exhibit "J-1" p 24E]. 
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The undisputed medical evidence in this case demonstrated that Mr. Lieberman's industrial 
accident of September 25, 1995 caused herniated disks at C5-6 and C6-7 On March 19, 1996, 
Mr. Lieberman underwent a microsurgical anterior diskectomy, decompression, allograft, fusion 
and plate fixation at C5-6, C6-7. Mr. Lieberman suffered a non-fusion at C6-7, and remained 
intermittently symptomatic until May 22, 1999, when he bumped his head on the door frame of 
his pickup truck. The unrefuted medical evidence in this case established that the incident of 
May 22, 1999, caused an exacerbation of the symptoms that resulted from Mr. Lieberman's non-
fusion at C6-7. The accepted medical evidence in this case revealed that Mr. Lieberman's 
symptoms were ultimately, causally related to his industrial accident of September 25, 1995. 
C. Recommended Medical Treatment. 
On June 28, 1999, Dr, Chung suggested that a correct diagnosis of Mr. Lieberman's problems 
would dictate the course of his treatment. [Exhibit "J-l" p. 12V]. On August 2, 1999, Dr. Hood, 
Mr. Lieberman's surgeon and treating physician, recommended that: 
Because of his failure of relief and documented non-union C6-7,1 have suggested 
re-exploration, removal of hardware, repeat interbody fusion and plate fixation at 
C6-7. [Exhibit "J-l" p. 24D]. 
Dr. Hood repeated this recommendation on September 10, 1999. 
The undisputed medical evidence in this case confirmed that because of the nonunion at C6-7, 
re-exploration, removal of hardware, repeat interbody fusion and plate fixation at C6-7 were 
medically reasonable and necessary to treat Mr. Lieberman's cervical neck problems. As already 
established herein, Mr. Lieberman's industrial accident of September 25, 1995 caused herniated 
disks at the C5-6 and C6-7 levels. A surgical attempt to repair the herniated disks resulted in a 
nonunion of the fusion at C6-7. The incident of May 22, 1999, exacerbated the symptoms 
suffered by Mr. Lieberman because of the nonunion and the original injury of September 25, 
1995. 
D. Period Of Temporary Total Disability. 
Dr. Hood concluded that because of the exacerbation of symptoms related to the nonunion, Mr. 
Lieberman remained temporarily totally disabled from employment ongoing from May 24, 1999. 
[Exhibit "J-l" p. 24E]. Dr. Hood recommended additional surgery to correct the problems 
endured by Mr. Lieberman. [Exhibit "J-l" p. 24E]. The unchallenged medical evidence in this 
case disclosed that Mr. Lieberman remained-temporarily totally disabled from May 24, 1999 
through the date of the hearing, and needed surgery to address his symptoms. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. Employment, Compensation Rate, And Injury. 
On September 25, 1995, Mr. Lieberman suffered two herniated disks at C5-6 and C6-7, when a 
14 pound case of lotion fell from between six and seven feet onto the top of Mr. Lieberman's 
head. Mr. Lieberman's herniated disks at C5-6 and C6-7 arose out of and within the course of 
his employment with McKesson. Mr. Lieberman's rate of temporary total compensation equaled 
$287.00 per week. 
B. Subsequent Injury. 
Mr. Lieberman's industrial accident of September 25, 1995 caused herniated disks at C5-6 and 
C6-7. On March 19, 1996, Mr. Lieberman underwent a microsurgical anterior diskectomy, 
decompression, allograft, fusion and plate fixation at C5-6, C6-7. Mr. Lieberman suffered a non-
fusion at C6-7, and remained intermittently symptomatic until May 22, 1999, when he bumped 
his head on the door frame of his pickup truck. The incident of May 22, 1999, caused an 
exacerbation of the symptoms that resulted from Mr. Lieberman's non-fusion at C6-7. 
McKesson alleged that the incident of May 22, 1999, where Mr. Lieberman bumped his head, 
constituted an independent, intervening, superseding cause of Mr. Lieberman's current medical 
problems and disability. Therefore, McKesson argued that Mr. Lieberman was not entitled to 
recover any workers' compensation benefits for his present problems and disability. 
Utah Code § 34A-2-401 states in relevant part that: 
(1) An employee ... who is injured ... by accident arising out of and in the course 
of the employee's employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident was 
not purposely self- inflicted, shall be paid: 
(a) Compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury .... 
(b) The amount provided in this chapter for; 
(i) Medical, nurse, and hospital services; 
(ii) medicines.... 
The statute plainly decrees an employee's entitlement to recover compensation for loss sustained 
on account of an industrial accident. 
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The Utah Supreme Court historically adopted the position that: 
incapacity which is caused or aggravated by a second injury, received while the 
employee is suffering from another injury which he had received in his 
employment, is a result of the first injury, *** and consequently compensation 
may be recovered therefor. Continental Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission, 
63 Utah 59, , 221 P. 852, (1923). 
The Utah Supreme Court applied the principles enunciated in Continental Casualty on several 
occasions. In one case the employee, Perchelli, sustained an industrially related back injury while 
lifting a bucket of wet cement. Perchelli v. Utah State Industrial Commission, 25 Utah 2d 58, 
59, 475 P. 2d 835, (1970). Perchelli continued to endure intermittent pain after the initial 
industrial accident. Id. Almost two years later Perchelli suffered an aggravation to his low back 
pain after a sneezing episode at home. Id. Perchelli's doctors diagnosed him with a herniated 
disc at L5 SI after the sneezing incident. Id. The Utah Supreme Court in Perchelli found that: 
[t]here is a reasonable medical probability had he not sneezed some other major or 
minor episode would have triggered the actual disc herniation requiring surgery. 
********** 
[i]n the case of a progressive back disorder, there may be a direct causal 
relationship between an industrial accident and a subsequent disability, although 
some other episode may represent the point of time when the industrial accident 
ripened into a compensable injury. Perchelli v. Utah State Industrial Commission, 
25 Utah 2d at 60, 475 P. 2d. at . 
In another relevant case, the employee Palfreyman, developed thrombophlebitis after an 
industrial accident wherein he injured his right knee. Fruehauf Trailer, Co. v. Industrial 
Commission Of Utah, 16 Utah 2d 95, 96, 396 P. 2d 409, (1964). Over two years after the 
injury to his knee, Palfreyman underwent gall bladder surgery and developed a pulmonary 
embolus during the operation. Id. Fruehauf argued that the gall bladder surgery constituted the 
direct intervening and independent cause of the pulmonary embolus and therefore Palfreyman 
should not recover any additional workers' compensation benefits as a result of the condition. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Fruehauf Trailer held: 
[t]he aggravating cause which flares up a previous injury need not be the result of 
an accident which is independently employment related. Fruehauf Trailer, Co. v. 
Industrial Commission Of Utah, 16 Utah 2d at 96-97, 396 P. 2d at . 
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In the present case Mr Lieberman's industrial accident of September 25, 1995 directly caused 
his herniated cervical disks at C5-6 and £6-7 Mr Lieberman's mdustnal accident of September 
25, 1995 necessitated the microsurgical anterior diskectomy, decompression, allograft, fusion 
and plate fixation at C5-6, C6-7 Mr Lieberman suffered a nonfusion at C6-7 and remained 
intermittently symptomatic with neck pain from September 25, 1995 through May 22, 1999, 
when he bumped his head on the door frame of his pickup truck 
Even after the exacerbation of May 22, 1999, the medical evidence attributed the original injury 
of September 25, 1995 as the underlying and principle cause of Mr Lieberman's current 
problems [Exhibit "J-1" pp 12Tand24E] This is demonstrated by the fact that Dr Hood's 
recommended medical treatment for Mr Lieberman's present condition consisted of re-
exploration, removal of hardware, repeat interbody fusion and plate fixation at C6-7, or a repair 
of the first operation Based on Utah case law, the incident of May 22, 1999, failed to constitute 
an event that would relieve McKesson of liability for Mr Lieberman's current disability and 
medical needs 
C. Recommended Medical Treatment. 
Because of the nonunion at C6-7, re-exploration, removal of hardware, repeat interbody fusion 
and plate fixation at C6-7 are medically reasonable and necessary to treat Mr Lieberman's 
cervical neck problems Mr Lieberman's industrial accident of September 25, 1995 caused 
herniated disks at the C5-6 and C6-7 levels A surgical attempt to repair the herniated disks 
resulted in a non-union of the fusion at C6-7 
D. Temporary Total Disability Compensation. 
Mr Lieberman remained temporanly totally disabled from May 24, 1999 through the date of this 
order and ongoing Mr Lieberman requires additional surgery to correct the problems disabling 
him Accordingly, Mr Lieberman is entitled to receive from McKesson $14,924 00 in temporary 
total disability compensation for the time penod May 24, 1999 through the date of this order [52 
weeks x $287 00/week = $14,924 00] McKesson should then continue to pay Mr Lieberman 
$287 00 per week ongoing until such time as he either is medically no longer temporanly totally 
disabled, or, reaches medical stability, or, receives the maximum 312 weeks temporary total 
disability payments allowed under Utah Code § 34A-2-410 (l)(b) 




IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that McKesson Corporation shall pay Robert P Lieberman 
temporary total disability compensation from May 24, 1999 through the date of this order, at the 
rate of $287 00 per week for 52 weeks, for a total of $14, 924 00, under Utah Code §34A-2-410 
That amount is accrued, due and payable m a lump sum, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per 
annum, under Utah Code §34A-2-420 (3) and Utah Administrative Code, Rule 612-1-5 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that McKesson Coiporation shall continue to pay Robert P 
Lieberman temporary total disability compensation at the rate of $287 00 per week ongoing until 
such time as he either is medically no longer temporarily totally disabled, or, reaches medical 
stability, or, receives the maximum 312 weeks temporary total disability payments allowed under 
Utah Code § 34A-2-410 (l)(b) 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that McKesson Corporation shall pay all medical expenses 
reasonably related to Robert Lieberman's industrial accident of September 25, 1995, including, 
but not limited to, re-exploration, removal of hardware, repeat interbody fusion and plate 
fixation at C6-7 All medical expenses shall be paid according to Utah Code § 34A-2-418, and 
the medical and surgical fee schedule of the Utah Labor Commission, and any travel allowances 
under Utah Administrative Code, Rule 612-2-20, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per annum, 
under Utah Code § 34A-2-420 (3) and Utah Administrative Code, Rule 612-2-13 
Dated this 24th day of May 2000, 
fbchkdMTTaTfenni^se • 
.dminlstrative Law Judge 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion For Review with the Adjudication 
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific 
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this 
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their Responses to the Motion for Review 
within 20 days of the Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct 
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its 
Response. If none of the parties specifically requests review by the Appeals Board, the review 
will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commissioner. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Alicia Zavala-Lopez, certify that I did mail by prepaid first class postage, except as noted 
below, a copy of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, And Order in the case of Robert P 
Lieberman v McKesson, Corporation, Case No 99885 on the 2 4 t h day of May 2000, to the 
following 
ROBERT LIEBERMAN 
5981 LAKESIDE DRIVE 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84121 
HENRY K CHAIII ESQ 
77 WEST 200 SOUTH 
SUITE 400 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
MCKESSON CORP 
ONE POST STREET 
SAN FRANCISCO CA 94104 
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ROBERT P. LIEBERMAN, 
ORDER DENYING 
Applicant, * MOTION FOR REVIEW 
MCKESSON CORP., * Case No. 99-0885 
* 
Defendant. * 
McKesson Corp. asks the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to review the 
Administrative Law Judge's award of benefits to Robert P. Lieberman under the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.). 
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Is Mr. Lieberman entitled to receive workers' compensation benefits for his current neck 
condition, which condition arises from a non-work accident that exacerbated a prior work related 
injury9 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Appeals Board adopts the findings of fact set forth in the ALJ's decision, summarized 
as follows. 
While employed by McKesson on September 25, 1995, Mr. Lieberman was involved in an 
accident that resulted in injuries to his neck. McKesson accepted liability under the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act for Mr. Lieberman's injuries and paid benefits accordingly. Mr. Lieberman 
underwent surgery on March 19, 1996, consisting of diskectomy, decompression, allograft, fusion 
and plate fixation at the C5-6 and C6-7 levels of his spine. After the surgery, Mr. Lieberman 
continued to experience some neck and back pain. Ultimately, it was determined that the graft and 
fusion had been successful at the C5-6 level of his spine, but unsuccessful at the C6-7 level. 
Nevertheless, Mr. Lieberman returned to work for a new employer prior to the events of May 22, 
1999, described below 
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On May 22, 1999, while entering his pickup truck at his home, Mr. Lieberman forcefully hit 
his head on the top of the door frame.1, The blow stunned him and he experienced immediate 
worsening of his neck and back pain. Dr. Hood, Mr. Lieberman's treating physician, has described 
the relationship between Mr. Lieberman's original work injuries and his current condition as follows: 
Patient underwent surgery 3-19-96 for original injury; however, there was non-union 
of the fusion. About 5-20-99 patient bumped his head which caused exacerbation of 
the symptoms related to the non-union 
Dr Chung, who examined Mr Lieberman on behalf of McKesson, agreed that Mr. 
Lieberman's non-work accident of May 22, 1999, exacerbated Mr. Lieberman's work-related neck 
condition. 
As a result of the foregoing events, Dr. Hood has recommended additional surgery to fuse 
Mr Lieberman's spine at the C6-7 level Because of his neck injury and need for surgery, Mr. 
Lieberman has been unable to work since May 24, 1999. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Section 34A-2-401 of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act requires employers and their 
insurance carriers to provide workers' compensation benefits for employees injured by accident 
arising out of and in the course of employment. Thus, McKesson is liable for workers' compensation 
benefits arising from Mr. Lieberman's work accident and injuries of September 25, 1995. What is 
in question is whether McKesson is also liable for the exacerbation of Mr. Lieberman's injuries that 
resulted from his non-work accident of May 22, 1999. 
The Utah Supreme Court considered a similar situation in Mountain States Casing Services 
v McKean, 706 P.2d 601(Utah 1985). There the Court stated the following principle: 
A subsequent injury is compensable if it is found to be a natural result of a 
compensable-primary injury. McKean is not required to show that his original tragedy 
was the sole cause of a subsequent injury, but only that the initial work-related 
accident was a contributing cause of his subsequent. . . injury. (Citations omitted.) 
The Appeals Board notes Mr. Lieberman's statement that his head hit the door frame 
with 120 pounds of thrust. However, Mr. Lieberman's method for computing the exact force of 
impact has not been established as scientifically valid. Consequently, while the Appeals Board 
accepts Mr. Lieberman's testimony that he "forcefully" hit the door frame, the Appeals Board 
does not accept his testimony that he hit the door frame with "120 pounds of thrust." 
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In Larson's Workers1 Compensation Law, §10.15, p. 10-12, Professor Larson reviews 
decisions from several states, including Utah, and concludes the following test should be applied to 
claims such as Mr Lieberman's-
When . the injury following the initial compensable injury does not arise out 
of a quasi-course activity,2... the chain of causation may be deemed broken by either 
intentional or negligent claimant misconduct. 
As to what constitutes "negligence" for purposes of the foregoing standard, Professor Larson 
indicates it "often takes the form of rashly undertaking a line of action with knowledge of the risk 
created by the weakened member." Larson at §10-06(3), p. 10-18. 
Applying the foregoing standard to Mr. Lieberman's current claim, the evidence establishes 
that Mr Lieberman's work accident and injury in 1995 resulted in a weakened condition of his neck. 
Specifically, Mr Lieberman was left with continuing neck and back pain as well as a failed graft and 
fusion at the C6-7 level of his spine. Mr. Lieberman's non-work accident in 1999, when he hit his 
head on his pickup door frame, acted on the weakened neck and exacerbated the pre-existing 
condition. 
Next, it is necessary to determine whether Mr. Lieberman's action in getting into his pickup 
was "negligent" so as to break the chain of causation between his work accident of September 25, 
1995, and his current injuries. There is no indication that Mr. Lieberman's acted in a rash or 
foolhardy manner in entering his pickup; rather, the event appears to be a simple accident brought on 
by ordinary error or unintentional miscalculation. The Appeals Board concludes Mr. Lieberman was 
not negligent and that his non- work accident in 1999 does not break the chain of causation between 
his 1995 work accident and his current injuries. 
In summary, the Appeals Board concludes that the injuries for which Mr. Lieberman now 
seeks benefits are a natural result of his primary compensable injury and are therefore compensable. 
2
 In using the term "quasi course," Professor Larson refers to " . . . activities undertaken 
by the employee following upon his or her injury which, although they take place outside the time 
and space limits of the employment, and would not be considered employment activities for usual 
purposes, are nevertheless related to the employment in the sense that they are necessary or 
reasonable activities that would not have been undertaken but for the compensable injury." 
Quasi-course activities included activities such as trips to doctors' offices, taking medicine and 
similar activities See Larson's Workers' Compensation. §10-05T p. 10-11 
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ORDER 
The Appeals Board affirms the decision of the ALJ and denies McKesson's motion for review 
ft is so ordered 
Dated this Yc ' 'day of August, 2000 
Patricia S Drawe 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider this 
Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days 
of the date of this order Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals 
by filing a petition for review with the court Any such petition for review must be received by the 
court within 30 days of the date of this order 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Review in the matter of 
Robert P. Lieberman, Case No. 99-0885, was mailed first class postage prepaid this_j^?7*dav of 
August, 2000, to the following: 
ROBERT P. LIEBERMAN 
5981 LAKESIDE DRIVE 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84121 
HENRY K. CHAIII, ATTORNEY 
BLACKBURN & STOLL 
77 WEST 200 SOUTH #400 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
MCKESSON CORP 
ONE POST STREET 
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